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Abstract
We study a setting where individuals prefer to coordinate with others but they
differ on their preferred action. Our interest is understanding the role of linking in
shaping behavior. So we consider the situation in which interactions are exogenous
and a situation where individuals choose links that determine the interactions. Theory
is permissive in both settings: conformism (on either of the actions) and diversity (with
different groups choosing their preferred actions) are both sustainable in equilibrium.
Our experiments reveal that, in an exogenous complete network, subjects choose
to conform to the majority’s preferred action. By contrast, when linking is free and
endogenous, subjects form dense networks (biased in favour of linking within same pref-
erences type) but choose diverse actions. The convergence to diverse actions is faster
under endogenous linking as compared to the convergence to conformity on the major-
ity’s preferred action under the exogenous complete network. Thus our experiments
suggest that individuals use links to resolve the coordination problem.
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1 Introduction
Predicting which of the many equilibria will be selected is perhaps the most
difficult problem in game theory [Camerer, 2003]
Diversity in norms, values, and modes of behavior is valued – both for intrinsic and
instrumental reasons – but it is also viewed as a social challenge. Academic work as well
as popular writing has voiced a concern on the fragmenting of society along the lines
of personal and social identity.1 In the domains of language, food, dress, education and
occupation, the returns to an action are intimately related to what others – especially those
close to us – choose. Personal and social identity creates expectations on the preferred
course of action in these domains. Thus, in our day to day life, we are confronted with a
range of decision problems that share a common tension. On the one hand, we would like
to coordinate our actions with those of others; on the other hand, we prefer some actions
over others. The goal of this paper is to better understand how we navigate this challenge.
To clarify the key considerations, we start by setting out a theoretical model. There is
a group of individuals who each choose between two actions up or down. Everyone prefers
to coordinate on one action but individuals differ in the action they prefer: group U prefers
action up, group D prefers action down. We consider a baseline setting in which everyone
is obliged to interact with everyone else, and a setting in which individuals choose with
whom to interact. In the latter setting, everyone observes the network that is created and
then chooses between action up and down. The theoretical analysis reveals a rich set of
possibilities.
Consider the case where everyone interacts with everyone else.2 There exist three
equilibria: everyone conforming to a single action, up or down, and diversity with group
U members choosing up and group D choosing down. Next consider the setting with
endogenous linking, and suppose that the costs of linking are zero. Now the outcomes
take two forms: one, every individual connects to everyone else and the action profile
corresponds to the three equilibria described above. The other situation exhibits partial
connectivity: an interesting special case arises when the network fragments into two distinct
components and individuals in each component choose a different action. Moreover, we
show that in both the exogenous and endogenous interaction setting, conforming to the
1For a classic early study of segregation in structured populations, see Schelling [1978]. For an overview
of recent arguments on how identity affects politics in a liberal democracy, see Fukuyama [2006].
2Formally, we refer to this as the exogenous complete network.
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majority’s preferred action maximizes aggregate welfare.3 Thus, there is a multiplicity in
outcomes, in both the exogenous and the endogenous linking case, and there is a tension
between diversity and aggregate welfare.4 We conduct laboratory experiments to better
understand how players choose actions and how these choices are affected by whether the
network is exogenous or endogenous.
The experiments involve groups of 15 subjects who play the game repeatedly, over 20
rounds. In each group, there is a majority sub-group with 8 subjects (who prefer action
up) and a minority sub-group with 7 subjects (who prefer action down). In all, there
are 6 groups with exogenous, and 6 groups with endogenous linking. We find that, with
exogenous interaction, conformity on the majority’s preferred action obtains in 5 out of 6
groups. By contrast, with endogenous linking, individuals form most of the possible links
(roughly 95 out of a possible 105), and yet in all groups they choose diversity. Thus, the
freedom to create links has a powerful effect on behavior and on aggregate welfare.5
The striking contrast between the coordination behavior in the exogenous and the en-
dogenous linking treatments leads us to an examination of possible explanations. We show
that standard theories of equilibrium selection – such as stochastic stability, team rea-
soning, k-level reasoning, and inequity aversion – cannot account for this evidence. It is
clear that endogenous linking pushes strongly toward the minority choosing its preferred
action. This leads us to examine experimental payoffs more closely: we find, somewhat
surprisingly, that average minority payoffs under the exogenous complete network are not
significantly different from the average payoffs obtained with the diversity outcome under
endogenous treatment. This is driven mainly by the difference in the rate of convergence
of actions: minority subjects converge significantly more quickly to the steady state action
profile in the endogenous linking treatment (as compared to the exogenous treatment).6
Taking these observations together leads us to the view that in the endogenous linking
treatment subjects use linking selectively and as an instrument to speedily resolve a com-
plex coordination problem more effectively.
3Indeed, in the experimental setting, the outcome with conformity on the majority’s action Pareto
dominates the outcome with diversity.
4In Section 5, we discuss a number of alternative equilibrium selection models.
5We also considered an experimental treatment with a minority of 3 members, and a majority of 12:
when the minority is so small we find that the freedom to form links makes no difference. Subjects choose
to conform with the majority’s preferred action both in the exogenous complete network as well as when
links are endogenous. This treatment is presented in Appendix B.2.
6Majority group subjects choose their preferred action and persist with that action from early on, in
both treatments.
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To test the robustness of this role for endogenous linking, we vary the costs of linking.
Different costs of linking lead to different networks: we study if the effects of endogenous
linking seen with zero costs are robust to this change.
Consider the case with positive costs. A general observation is that for positive costs
the outcome with a complete network and conformism on the majority’s preferred action
remains an equilibrium. However, there are other equilibria: of special interest is the
outcome in which there are no links between individuals with different preferences and
they choose their most preferred action. Our second experimental finding is that, in all the
6 groups we studied, subjects select the outcome with segregation and diversity.
Finally, we turn to negative linking costs (or link subsidy): we first note that under
our equilibrium notion, the linking also leads to a complete network. However, the action
profile varies: indeed, both conformism on the majority’s preferred action and diversity
of actions is sustainable in equilibrium. Our third experimental finding is that, in all the
6 groups we studied, subjects form dense (and almost complete) networks but that they
choose diverse actions.
To summarize, with the complete exogenous network, subjects choose to conform on the
majority’s preferred action. By contrast, in all the treatments with endogenous linking,
subjects always opt for diversity of actions. Thus diversity is a robust outcome under
endogenous linking.
Our paper is a contribution to the study of social coordination. Following the early
contributions of Schelling [1960] and Lewis [1969], there has been a large and influential
strand of research on coordination problems in economics. Blume [1993] and Ellison [1993]
drew attention to the role of interaction structures in shaping coordination, while Goyal
and Vega-Redondo [2005] and Jackson and Watts [2002] developed models in which players
choose partners and also actions in a coordination game. In more recent years, a number of
researchers have introduced heterogeneity of preferences in these models as a way to think
about culture and identity, see e.g., Advani and Reich [2015], Bojanowski and Buskens
[2011] and Ellwardt et al. [2016] and Neary [2012]. Our paper conducts an experimental
investigation on the role of endogenous linking in such a setting.
There is a large experimental literature on social coordination, see e.g. Charness et al.
[2014], Crawford [1995], Isoni et al. [2014] and Kearns et al. [2012]. Our experimental work
departs from this work in that it brings together heterogenous preferences on actions and
we allow for individuals to choose with whom to interact. Bringing together these two
features has large effects. To bring this out clearly, consider the minimum effort game:
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it offers a simple way for thinking about situations in which everyone must agree about
the outcome and yet there is a range of Pareto ranked (equilibrium) actions. The early
experiments on this game showed that subjects converged to the lowest welfare Nash equi-
librium [Van Huyck et al., 1990]. A number of variations on the original experiment with
varying outcomes have been reported since then; notable contributions include van Huyk
et al. [1991] and Crawford and Broseta [1998]. Our paper is also related to Riedl et al.
[2016]. Riedl et al. [2016] introduce the possibility that players can choose their partners
while playing the minimum effort game. They find that endogenizing the choice of part-
ners has a dramatic effect on behavior: players now converge to the most efficient Nash
equilibrium. By contrast, in our paper, introducing endogenous links leads to play con-
verging to a Pareto-dominated outcome. Thus, our work shows that endogenizing linking
can have very different consequences for social welfare, depending on whether individuals
have heterogeneous or similar preferences.
At a more general level, our paper contributes to the work on identity. There is a
large literature on identity, spanning across several disciplines in the social sciences and
in philosophy. In recent years, there has been a great deal of interest in understanding
the ways in which identity shapes behavior in society, organizations, markets, and in local
government, see e.g. Advani and Reich [2015], Akerlof and Kranton [2000], Alesina et al.
[1999], Bisin and Verdier [2000], and Sethi and Somanathan [2004]. Types in our setting
may naturally be interpreted as an aspect of identity. In particular, following the work
of Sherif et al. [1988], a number of papers have looked at the role of identity in shaping
behavior in an experimental setting. These papers have developed an experimental design
in which identity is ‘minimal’: individuals are made to associate themselves with others
who share a similar view on something orthogonal to the experiment itself. A common
example is shared ideas on a piece of art: so two individuals share the same identity
if they like the same painting and not otherwise. The experiment then shows how this
‘minimal group’ identity can play a large role in shaping behavior in games and decision
problems. A leading paper in this line of work, Chen and Chen [2011], shows that group
identity has direct effects on social preferences, which in turn can induce higher effort in
the minimum effort game. They show that exogenously varying the salience of identity
leads to a significant improvement in efficiency of play in this game.
Relative to Chen and Chen [2011], an important difference is that we allow for het-
erogenous preferences. In our model, ‘identities’ are reflected in payoff differences and they
are kept constant across the exogenous and endogenous linking treatments. Our principal
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experimental finding is that endogenous linking allows distinct preferences more space to
become salient. This is perhaps best revealed in the treatment where the costs of linking
are zero. But then we are in the same setting as the exogenous networks, and so subjects
should all conform on the majority’s preferred action. In the experiment, however, sub-
jects create ‘almost’ complete networks but different types nevertheless choose their own
preferred actions! Thus, the freedom to choose links helps individuals differentiate along
preference types.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the theoretical
analysis. Section 3 presents our experimental design and the experimental findings on
endogenous versus exogenous networks. Section 4 develops our argument exploring the
role of diversity. Section 5 discusses four alternative theoretical approaches — stochastic
stability, team reasoning, social preferences, and k-level reasoning – to explain our findings.
Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains some of the proofs, Appendix B contains some
additional experiments while Appendix C contains the instructions for the experiments.
2 Theory
We study a game of network formation and action choice in which individuals benefit from
selecting the same action as their neighbours. However, individuals differ on their preferred
action. There are thus two types of individuals. We study networks that are stable and
describe the corresponding equilibrium actions.
2.1 The model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} with n ≥ 3. The game has two stages. In the first stage, every player
i ∈ N chooses a set of link proposals gi with others, gi = (gi1, . . . , gii−1, gii+1, . . . , gin),
where gij ∈ {0, 1} for any j ∈ N\{i}. Let Gi = {0, 1}n−1 define i’s set of link proposals.
The induced network g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn) is a directed graph. The closure of g is an
undirected network denoted by g where gij = gijgji for every i, j ∈ N . We define the finite
set of all undirected networks g as G. Player i’s strategy in the second stage is defined
through a function xi mapping every undirected network g that can result from the first
stage to an action in A = {up, down}. Formally, xi : G→ A, and we define Xi as the set of
all such strategies for player i. We denote the set of overall strategies of player i in the full
game as Si = Gi×Xi, and the set of overall strategies for all players as S = S1× . . .×Sn.
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A strategy profile s = (x, g) specifies the link proposals made by every player in the first
stage through g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn), and the choice functions made by each player in the
second stage through x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). We define Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : gij = 1} as the set
of i’s neighbours in the network g.
Moreover, for every player i, let θi ∈ {up, down} define i’s type. This leads us to define
Nu = {i ∈ N : θi = up} and Nd = {i ∈ N : θi = down} as the groups of players preferring
action up and down, respectively (Nu ∪ Nd = N). If |Nu| 6= |Nd|, we refer to the largest
group of players sharing the same type/preferences as the majority and the other group as
the minority. Furthermore, we define
χi(g, x) = {j ∈ Ni(g) : xj = θi} (1)
as the set of i’s neighbours who play i’s preferred action (χi(g) ⊆ Ni(g)). In what
follows, we shall write g− gij (resp. g+ g¯ij) to refer to an undirected network g′ such that
g¯′ij = 0 (resp. g
′
ij = 1) and g
′
kl = g¯kl if k 6∈ {i, j} or l 6∈ {i, j}.
Given strategy profile s, the utility for player i is defined as:
ui(x, g) = λ
θi
xi(1 +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
I{xi=xj})− |Ni(g)|k (2)
where Ixj=xi is the indicator function of i’s neighbour j choosing the same action as player
i. The parameter λ is defined as follows: λθixi = α if xi(g) = θi (i chooses his preferred
action), and λθixi(g) = β if xi(g) 6= θi (i chooses his least preferred action) with β < α. This
payoff function is taken from Ellwardt et al. [2016].
To focus on the interesting cases, we will assume a cost of forming a link k < β. Observe
that if β < k, then no player will benefit from playing their less preferred action. Moreover,
if α < k, then no player benefits from forming any link.
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
This section studies equilibrium networks and behavior. We solve backwards, starting with
behavior in a given network. We then move to stage 1 and solve for stable networks.
For ease of exposition, we will drop the argument g and simply refer to strategies by xi.
The following result, taken from Ellwardt et al. [2016], characterises equilibrium behavior
in an arbitrary network.
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Proposition 1. Fix a network g. A strategy profile x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if, for every i ∈ N :
x∗i
= θi if |χi(g)| >
β
α+β |Ni(g)| − α−βα+β
6= θi if |χi(g)| < βα+β |Ni(g)| − α−βα+β
The proof of this result follows from computations which are presented in the main
text as they provide a good sense of the basic trade-offs involved. Player i’s payoff from
choosing θi is α(|χi(g)| + 1) and from choosing the other action is β(Ni(g) − |χi(g)| + 1).
So he is strictly better off choosing θi if and only if
α(|χi(g)|+ 1) > β(|Ni(g)| − |χi(g)|+ 1). (3)
This inequality can be rewritten as
|χi(g)| > β
α+ β
|Ni(g)| − α− β
α+ β
(4)
Intuitively, a player is better off selecting his preferred action if and only if the pro-
portion of his neighbours in g selecting the same action is sufficiently large. To illustrate
the implications of this result we consider a complete network. This network is interesting
as it captures a situation of full integration where every player interacts with every other
player.
Proposition 2. Fix a complete network g. Everyone choosing the same action is an
equilibrium if and only if n ≥ α/β. Every player choosing their preferred action is an
equilibrium if and only if |Nu|, |Nd| ≥ β(n+1)α+β .
We sketch the proof here. To fix ideas, consider conformism on the majority’s preferred
action ‘up’. The payoff to a majority individual is nα and the payoff to a minority individual
is nβ. Since a deviating minority individual would obtain a payoff of α, it then follows
that conformism is an equilibrium if n ≥ α/β. Similar computations also hold for the
conformism on the minority preferred equilibrium (on action ‘down’).
Turning to the diversity outcome, note that if some player i benefits by playing xi 6= θi,
then so would every player j of the same type. It then follows from Proposition 1 that
diversity is an equilibrium if:
|Ny| − 1 ≥ β
α+ β
(n− 1)− α− β
α+ β
. (5)
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(a) Conformity on blue (b) Conformity on red (c) Diversity
Figure 1: Nash equilibria in the complete network. A circle (triangle) node prefers action
blue (red). The border color of a node represents its chosen action.
for y ∈ {u, d}. This inequality can be rewritten as
|Ny| ≥ β(n+ 1)
α+ β
(6)
for any y ∈ {u, d}. This completes the proof.
In a complete network there are three equilibrium outcomes: conformity where every
player coordinates on the same action, up or down, and diversity where every player chooses
their preferred action. Observe that conformity outcomes are always equilibria, regardless
of the fraction of different types. On the other hand, the existence of the diversity outcome
is contingent on a sufficiently large minority. Figure 1 illustrates these equilibrium outcomes
in a society with 15 individuals. There are 8 players represented by “circles” and the
remaining 7 individuals are represented by “triangles”. The circles prefer action ‘up’,
while the triangles prefer action ‘down’. In all the figures throughout the article, action
‘up’ is represented by color “blue” while action ‘down’ is represented by color “red”.
We now solve the two stage game with link formation and action choices. We adapt
the pairwise stability notion from Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] to our setting. In the spirit
of their definition, we say that a network and corresponding equilibrium action profile is
stable if no individual can profitably deviate either unilaterally or with one other individual.
Given a network action pair (g, x(g)), x−ij(g) refers to the choices of all players, other than
players i and j.
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Definition 1. A network-action pair (g, x(g)) is pairwise stable if:
• x(g) is an equilibrium action profile given network g.
• for every gij = 1, ui(x, g) ≥ ui(x, g − gij) and uj(x, g) ≥ uj(x, g − gij), where x is
such that x−ij(g − gij) = x−ij(g), and xl ∈ arg maxx′l∈Xl ul(θl, x′l, x−l, g − gij) for
l ∈ {i, j}.
• for every gij = 0, ui(x, g) ≥ ui(x, g+ gij) or uj(x, g) ≥ uj(x, g+ gij) where x is such
that x−ij(g+gij) = x−ij(g), and xl ∈ arg maxx′l∈Xl ul(θl, x′l, x−l, g+gij) for l ∈ {i, j}.
In this definition, part (2) says that no player can delete an existing link and profit, while
part (3) says that no pair of players can form an additional link and increase their payoffs.
In both cases, note that we only require that the players directly affected by a change of
the link re-optimize actions; all other players remain with their pre-specified equilibrium
action, corresponding to network g. This restriction to very local action adjustments are
in the spirit of pairwise stability. Our aim here is to show that conformism and diversity
can both be supported in a pairwise stable outcome; moreover, these outcomes can be
supported by fairly different network structures. We believe that this general observation
is robust in the sense that it does not depend on specific details of the definition above.
A useful implication of Definition 1 is that in a pairwise stable network-action pair
(g, x(g)), then any two players who choose the same action in the second stage must also
be linked with each other: for any pair i, j ∈ N , xi(g) = xj(g) only if gij = 1.7
Proposition 3. Suppose k = 0 and (g∗, x∗(g∗)) is pairwise stable. Then either of two
possibilities obtains:
(i) g∗ is a complete network and for all i ∈ N , x∗i (g∗) = m, where m ∈ {up, down}.
(ii) g∗ is not the complete network. If there are two components, then individuals within
a component choose the same action but actions differ across components. If there is
only one component, then individuals who choose the same action are always linked.
The proof of Proposition 3 is immediate from the observation preceding it. This result
highlights four types of equilibrium outcomes. Integration with conformity arises when the
network is complete and everyone chooses the same action. Integration with diversity arises
7This result covers the case of k = 0; we also study games with positive and negative costs to linking in
section 4 below.
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(a) Integration and
Conformity on majority’s
preferred action
(b) Integration and
Conformity on minority’s
preferred action
(c) Integration and
Diversity
(d) Segregation and Diversity (e) Partial integration and Diversity
Figure 2: Pairwise stable outcomes for k = 0. A circle (triangle) node prefers action blue
(red). The border color of a node represents its chosen action.
when the network is complete and everyone chooses their preferred action. Segregation
with diversity arises when the network contains two components and individuals in the
two components choose a different action. Finally, partial integration with diversity arises
when individuals choose distinct actions, all individuals with the same action are linked
while the agents choosing dissimilar actions are only partially linked.
We illustrate these outcomes with our example (n = 15, |Ncircle| = 8, and |Ntriangle| =
7). The conformity and diversity outcomes with integration are illustrated in the top half
of Figure 2 while the segregation and partial integration are illustrated in the bottom half
of Figure 2.
We now turn to social welfare which we define as the sum of earnings of all players.
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An outcome is said to be socially efficient if it maximizes aggregate welfare. We show
that both with the complete network and with endogenous networks conformism on the
majority’s preferred action maximizes social surplus.
Proposition 4. In a complete network, conformity on the majority’s preferred action is
socially efficient. In the game with linking and action choice, the socially efficient outcome
entails a complete network and conformity on the majority’s preferred action.
The proof is presented in Appendix A. The result says that diversity is never socially
desirable. To develop some intuition for the result, consider the complete network. Fixing
the behavior of one group, it is never desirable for the other group to mix actions. This
follows from the coordination externalities inherent to our model. So we only need to
compare the two outcomes: one, where everyone conforms to action up, and two, where
everyone conforms to action down. The concluding step then shows that conformism on
up is better if and only if the group that prefers up constitutes a majority. So, in our
example, with exogenous complete network, the socially efficient outcome corresponds to
Figure 1(a). Similarly, in the endogenous links treatment, the unique socially efficient
outcome is presented in Figure 2(a).
In some circumstances, we may wish to consider Pareto-domination. It is easy to see
that the majority group is always better off when everyone conforms to the majority’s
preferred action, but the minority may or may not be better off. Assuming that the
network is complete, it is easy to verify that conformism on the majority’s preferred action
Pareto-dominates diversity in actions if n/min{Nu, Nd} > α/β.
We summarize the theoretical analysis as follows: in the exogenous complete network
there exist multiple equilibria exhibiting conformity and diversity. The conformity equi-
libria are independent of group sizes, while the diversity equilibria can only arise if the
minority group is not too small. With endogenous links, there exist multiple equilibria
exhibiting full integration with conformity, segregation with diversity, and also partial and
full integration with diversity. In both the exogenous complete network and the endoge-
nous network setting, conformity on the majority’s preferred action maximizes aggregate
social welfare.
We now conduct laboratory experiments to examine how allowing for network formation
shapes the patterns of social coordination.
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3 Experiments
3.1 Experimental design
To evaluate the effects of linking on coordination and on welfare, we study two main
treatments: ENDO and EXO. The treatment ENDO starts with an empty network and
refers to the two stage model of linking and action choice. The treatment EXO specifies
that players are located in an exogenously given complete network and they simply choose
between two coordination actions.
Throughout we consider groups of 15 subjects. Subjects interact repeatedly, within the
same group, for 20 rounds (plus 5 unpaid trial rounds). Prior to the start of play, subjects
are informed of a symbol, either a circle or a triangle, and an identification number, from
1 to 15, assigned to them. Every subject knows his symbol, number and the symbol and
number of the 14 others in his group. Both symbol and number are kept fixed for the
entire session. Groups are composed of 8 circles (the majority group) and 7 triangles
(the minority group). Figure 3 presents the screen that subjects see at the start of the
experiment (note that the positions of circles and triangles are mixed to avoid potential
visual biases).
In the treatment ENDO, there are two stages. First, subjects simultaneously make
proposals to a subset of the others in their group. Reciprocated proposals lead to the
creation of links. In the baseline experiment, no cost is paid for any link formed (i.e.,
k = 0). Then, in the second stage, subjects are informed of the links proposed and those
that are formed in stage 1. After observing the created network, subjects choose one of two
actions: up or down. Figure 4 illustrates information about the network that they observe
at this point. In the screenshot, links that are proposed but not reciprocated are represented
as light shorter ‘incomplete’ edges,8 a link to i. while reciprocated (bilateral) proposals are
represented as dark longer and ‘completed’ links. Reciprocated and unreciprocated links
involving the decision maker are highlighted in red while any other link is depicted in grey.
So in the screenshot in Figure 4, player 14 creates links with 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.
He does not reciprocate proposals from 5 and 6, while he makes unreciprocated proposals
to 1, 4 and 15.
The values of the parameters are α = 4 (payoff for coordinating with a connected player
on one’s most preferred action), β = 2 (payoff for coordinating with a connected player
8An edge departing from node i towards node j without connecting j means that player i proposes a
link to player j while j does not propose
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Figure 3: Stage 1 in round 1: choosing proposals. The network display illustrates the type
and identity number of each player in a group. The decision maker’s identity
marker is also presented at the bottom of the screen.
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Figure 4: Stage 2 in any round: choosing up or down. In the network display, unrecipro-
cated proposals are represented as light ‘incomplete’ edges, whereas reciprocated
proposals are represented as dark ‘complete’ edges. The decision maker’s pro-
posals are highlighted in red.
14
Figure 5: End of any round. The decision maker observes own links, and which player(s)
chose the same action (in red). Earnings of the decision maker are summarized
on the right hand side of the screen.
on one’s least preferred action), and k = 0 (cost of any bilateral link). For a subject with
symbol circle (triangle), his preferred action is up (down). Every player sees the outcome
of the game on the screen and his net payoffs as in Figure 5. Here we see that player 14’s
neighborhood includes 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. He coordinates successfully on his
preferred action with players 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, and he fails to coordinate with 2.
Thus his net payoff is 8 × 4 = 32. Finally, at the beginning of any round r>1, in stage
1, every player receives information about every other player’s links and actions in the
previous round, as shown through Figure 6.
In the treatment EXO, all subjects interact with every other group member in a com-
plete network. The subjects are shown the complete network and they have to choose
15
Figure 6: Stage 1 in round r > 1: choosing proposals. The decision maker observes a
summary of proposals, links, and actions from round r − 1.
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between actions up and down.9 Given that there is no linking decision, there are also
no linking costs. For this reason, and to make earnings comparable between treatments,
the parameters in EXO are α = 4 and β = 2. The detailed instructions handed out to
subjects in both treatments ENDO and EXO are presented in Appendix C. In Table 1,
we summarize the equilibrium payoffs for each type of player and each treatment.
Endogenous Exogenous
Player
type
∆ 30 28 30 28
O 60 32 60 32
Table 1: Individual equilibrium payoffs. A circle (triangle) node prefers action blue (red).
It is clear from Table 1 that, although conformity on the majority’s preferred action is
Pareto dominant, each minority player only has little to gain from reaching that equilib-
rium. However, every majority player can earn significantly more if all minority players
conform to their preferred action. Note that the equilibrium payoffs are invariant to the
experimental treatments.
3.2 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted in the Laboratory for Research in Experimental and Be-
havioural Economics (LINEEX) at the University of Valencia. Subjects interacted through
computer terminals and the experiment was programmed using z-Tree [Fischbacher, 2007].
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory. At the beginning of the ex-
periment subjects received printed instructions, which were read out loud to guarantee that
they all received the same information. At the end of the experiment each subject answered
a debriefing questionnaire. The standard conditions of anonymity and non-deception were
implemented in the experiment.
Subjects were recruited through an online recruitment system. For each treatment, we
9The complete network is however shown as it would be in ENDO, had the complete network emerged.
See the instructions in Appendix C.
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conducted 2 sessions; in each session there were three groups with 15 subjects each. Thus
there were six groups per treatment. Each session lasted between 90 and 120 minutes, and
on average subjects earned approximately 18 euros.
3.3 Experimental Findings
For ease of exposition, we will present average behavior across groups on a round by round
basis in the various plots. However, as the groups are playing a repeated game across twenty
rounds, clearly observations across rounds for a group are not independent. So we will
simply take the average across the twenty rounds for each group as the observation. This
means that in the statistical tests we will have six independent observations (corresponding
to the six groups), per treatment.
We note that the treatments require a group of 15 subjects to play the same game
repeatedly (20 times). In principle, therefore, we should also be considering repeated game
effects. In our setting, equilibria of the repeated game will include a sequence of the static
game equilibrium, and possibly other more complicated patterns of behavior (that are not
equilibrium in the static one shot game). In the experiments, subjects converge fairly
quickly and behave very much in line with a static equilibrium. The key finding is the
contrast in outcomes between the exogenous and the endogenous linking setting. As both
these treatments involve repeated interactions, we feel that repeated game effects are not
central to understanding this difference.
Consider the treatment ENDO. Figure 7 depicts the proportion of links missing in
the network (total number of missing links divided by the maximum number of missing
links, i.e., 105). It shows that the network is highly connected from round 1, and that
the high rates of connectivity continue over time, without much variation. Subjects create
roughly 94.5 links out of a maximum total of 105 links (10% of missing links); in other
words, individual degree is on average 12.59 (out of 14 possible links). We further observe
from Figure 7 that most of the missing links are between players of different preference
types. Almost all links between players of the same preference type are formed. Since the
difference in network density between EXO and ENDO is very small, a first thought is
that since the networks under the two treatments are so similar, the payoffs too are similar
and so subjects should also choose the same actions in the coordination game under both
treatments.
Under treatment EXO, in five out of the six groups, all subjects conform fully with the
18
Figure 7: Proportion of missing links in Treatment ENDO. The green area represents the
number of missing links between players with different types divided by the total
number of possible links. The brown area represents the number of missing
links between players with the same type divided by the total number of possible
links.
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majority’s preferred action. By contrast, under treatment ENDO, individuals in all six
groups choose actions in line with their preferences and diversity obtains.10 In particular,
the average number of subjects choosing the majority’s action across groups and rounds
is significantly lower under ENDO as compared to EXO, 8.18 < 12.68 (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney: z = 7.73, p < 0.0001). Figure 8 further shows that the main source of the
difference between the treatments is the difference in the choice of the minority.
To summarize: under both treatments, the majority chooses its preferred action almost
from the start and persists with it across all the rounds. The behavior of the minority is
dramatically different depending on whether links are exogenous or endogenous. Under
EXO, around 40% of the minority (on average across groups) start by conforming to the
majority’s preferred action, and by round 10 this fraction is well in excess of 80%. Under
ENDO, most of minority individuals – around 90% (on average across groups) – choose
their preferred action from the start, and by round 10 this goes up to 95% of the group.
Experimental Finding 1. In the exogenous complete network setting, subjects conform
to the majority’s preferred action. By contrast, in the endogenous linking game, subjects
create a dense network (that is biased in favor of links within the same preference type),
and individuals of the two groups each choose their preferred action.
This suggests that allowing individuals the freedom to choose links with others leads
to dramatically different behavior in the coordination game.
The prevalence of diversity observed in the endogenous treatment has a significant
impact on payoffs and efficiency. As previously shown in Table 1, diversity is Pareto
dominated by conformity on the majority’s preferred action. Moreover, such inefficiency
is stronger for the majority player who earn 32 points instead of 60, than for the minority
players who earn 28 points instead of 30.
It is clear from our results that the minority’s behavior is critical in driving one outcome
or another (the majority’s behavior is not significantly different across treatments, as shown
through Figure 8). The theory predicts that the minority is strictly worse off under the
diversity outcome as compared to conformity on the majority’s action. Let us examine
the minority’s attained payoffs more closely. Figure 9 indicates that there is indeed no
10We note that in the unique non conforming group from EXO, the minority and the majority choose
their preferred action. There are no differences in results regarding the tests used, except for the last case:
the number of minority players conforming in EXO is significantly different from 7 in all rounds if the
outlier group is included. Therefore, we omit this group from the analysis.
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Figure 8: Fraction of choosing ‘up’ in Treatments EXO(TOP) and ENDO(BOTTOM).
The brown (green) area represents the fraction of minority (majority) players
choosing action ‘up’.
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Figure 9: Average payoff (in points) among the minority players in Treatments EXO and
ENDO.
significant difference in payoff across the two treatments (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney: z=-
0.31, p=0.76), suggesting that coordination on the diversity outcome in ENDO is faster
than coordination on the conformity outcome in EXO. This lack of difference in attained
payoffs in turn suggests that the dynamics of convergence to steady state to conformity
and to diversity, respectively, are probably different.
Indeed, we identify a significant difference in the speed of convergence in the two treat-
ments, using the Jonckheere-Terpstra test:11 in EXO, the increasing trend toward higher
payoffs is present in the first ten rounds (TJT=4.19, p=0.00) as well as in the last ten
rounds (TJT=2.25, p=0.01). In ENDO, the increasing trend is only present in the first
ten rounds (TJT=1.71, p=0.04), but there is no variance in the last ten rounds (TJT=0.54,
p=0.29). Thus payoffs stabilize significantly faster in ENDO than in EXO. Taken together
this analysis yields two insights: one, the minority does not lose out in payoffs by opting
for the diversity outcome, and two, the key reason for this is that the coordination problem
11This is a non-parametric test for ordered differences of a payoff variable among classes. We are testing
here the null hypothesis that the distribution of frequency of payoffs does not differ across rounds. The
alternative hypothesis is that there is an ordered difference among rounds.
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is resolved faster under endogenous linking.
This result is consistent with the view that, in this experiment, individuals are facing
a very complex coordination problem, due to the combination of many players and the
heterogeneity in preferences. So it is only natural that they will try and use cues from
the environment and instruments that they have available to simplify the coordination
problem. The experiment points to the role of linking.
4 The Robustness of Diversity
First we will look at the role of linking costs. In the positive cost case, for a minority
player to form a link with a majority player indicates a willingness to go along and conform
with the majority’s preferred action. So not forming a link signals an intention to stick
to one’s own preferred action. We therefore expect a close relation between networks
and action choice. Next consider negative costs: As not forming a link is costly, we
conjecture that individuals should tend toward forming all links. This in turn would
allow a direct comparison between the exogenous complete network and the endogenously
generated network.
Second, we will sample networks from the endogenous treatment, fix them as exogenous
networks and examine behavior. The interest here is in seeing whether the behavior of
subjects remains unchanged or if it is different from the behavior in the endogenous network.
If behavior is markedly different then that would suggest that the act of linking per se is
important.
There are four treatments. The following table provides a summary of the experimental
design in this section.
Network (N = 15)
Endogenous Exogenous
(incomplete networks)
k = −0.3 k = 0.5 -
SUBSIDY COST EXOSYM EXOASYM
(6 groups) (6 groups) (6 groups) (6 groups)
Table 2: Experimental Treatments
The negative linking cost treatment is denoted as SUBSIDY, while the positive cost
treatment is denoted as COST. The two exogenous network treatments take up different
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patterns of missing links with majority players (compared to a complete network): treat-
ment EXOSYM captures a case where the missing links are evenly distributed across
the minority individuals, whereas treatment EXOASYM captures a case where they are
unevenly distributed (more details of the exact networks used are presented in section 4.2
below.)
4.1 Varying the cost of linking
We start with costly links. When links are costly, two players should only form a link if
they intend to choose the same action in the coordination game. It follows from Definition
1 that for any pair i, j ∈ N , xi(g) = xj(g) if and only if gij = 1. Building on this
observation, we get the following result.
Proposition 5. Suppose k > 0 and (g∗, x∗(g∗)) is pairwise stable. Then one of the follow-
ing outcomes obtains:
(i) g∗ is a complete network and conformism obtains, ∀i ∈ N , x∗i (g∗) = m, where
m ∈ {up, down}.
(ii) g∗ contains two complete components, Cu and Cd; every player in Cu chooses up,
while every player in Cd chooses down.
Thus, there are two types of pairwise stable outcomes: integration with conformity and
segregation with diversity. Observe that the result does not specify the exact size of the
two components in the second part. A wide range of different component sizes can be
sustained.
In the costly links treatment COST, we set the parameters as α = 4.5, β = 2.5 and
k = 0.5.12 We observe that individuals are active in creating links from early on, but this
linking activity is mostly focused within types. Linking across players of different types
is very limited at the start, and becomes rarer over time. Individuals choose their own
preferred action: there is convergence to diversity.
At the start, on average (across groups), more than 80% of the links within the same
types are formed, but about 20% of the cross type links are also formed. By round 10, this
tendency accentuates and around 90% of the within group links are in place, but less than
12Observe that being connected with a player who plays one’s most preferred action is worth α = 4 in
EXO and α − k = 4 in COST and ENDO. Similarly, for the payoffs from the less preferred action, the
payoff is 2 in all those treatments.
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10% of the cross group links are being formed. Eventually, the network converges to two
distinct complete components that have virtually no links between them. Out of the 105
links that can be formed, there are on average only 53 (across groups and rounds), which
corresponds to over 49% of missing links. However, it is clear from Figure 10 that most
of the missing links are between players with different preference types. As in Treatment
ENDO, most links are formed between players sharing the same preference type. Indeed,
the average degree (across groups and rounds) of the minority is 6.35 and that of the
majority is 7.69.13 The majority form on average the same number of within-type links
in COST and ENDO (z = 1.596, p = 0.1105), while the minority was significantly less
connected in COST (z = 5.292, p < 0.0001). But the main difference is in the across-
group ties: this decreases from 6.19 links in ENDO to 0.98 links in COST (z = 7.699,
p < 0.0001). Thus we see the emergence of (almost) complete segregation in Figure 10.
We now turn to actions: Figure 12 illustrates the dynamics of action choice under
Treatment COST. The main observation is that subjects choose diversity, similarly to
Treatment ENDO. To summarize:
Experimental Finding 2. When the cost of linking is positive, subjects create an almost
completely segregated network and individuals of the two groups each choose their preferred
action.
Let us now consider the case where linking has a positive cost. Observe that any two
players can strictly increase their payoffs by forming a link, regardless of whether they
subsequently coordinate their actions. So it follows from Definition 1 that in a pairwise
stable network-action pair, for any pair i, j ∈ N , gij = 1. Then the following result is
immediate:
Proposition 6. Suppose k < 0 and (g∗, x∗(g∗)) is pairwise stable. Then either
(i) g∗ is complete and conformism obtains, ∀i ∈ N , x∗i (g∗) = m, where m ∈ {up, down}.
OR
(ii) g∗ is complete and diversity obtains, ∀i ∈ N , x∗i (g∗) = θi.
Thus there exist only two types of pairwise stable outcomes: integration with conformity
and integration with diversity.
13Recall there are 7 (8) players in the minority (majority) so that each of them can link to at most 6 (7)
others sharing the same type.
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Figure 10: Proportion of missing links in Treatment COST. The green area represents
the number of missing links between players with different types divided by
the total number of possible links. The brown area represents the number of
missing links between players with the same type divided by the total number
of possible links.
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In our experiment, we set the parameters as α = 4, β = 2, and k = −0.3.14
Turning to the experimental results, we present the proportion of missing links across
groups and rounds in Figure 11. The first observation is that connectivity is high and
that it is higher than under Treatment ENDO, 101.4 > 94.5 (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney:
z = 7.631, p < 0.0001). Note that in one group (group 5), no link is missing from start to
finish. On average, both types of individuals again create all the links with others of the
same preference type and the few missing links all involve members of different preference
type.
Figure 12 presents patterns of choice in the coordination game. We observe quick
convergence to diversity in actions.
To summarize:
Experimental Finding 3. When the cost of linking is negative, subjects choose a dense
network (that is biased in favour of links within the same preference type), and individuals
of the two groups each choose their preferred action.
Moreover, and in line with Treatment ENDO, we find that in Treatment COST there
is an increasing trend toward higher payoffs in the first ten rounds (TJT=1.59, p=0.06), but
there is no variance in the last ten rounds (TJT=1.05, p=0.15). In Treatment SUBSIDY
there is an even more rapid convergence in actions in the earlier rounds. Overall, we
conclude that, in the presence of endogenous linking, minority players use links to achieve
quicker convergence of actions.
4.2 Exogenous almost complete network
We turn now to a more direct examination of the role of endogenous linking. The strategy
here is to take dense networks that were created by subjects in the treatment ENDO
and set them up as exogenous networks and have the subjects play coordination games on
these networks. The thought here is that if linking per se is important then the behavior in
the endogenously generated network and the corresponding exogenously imposed network
would be very different.
There are a range of networks observed in the ENDO treatment: we take two distinct
network configurations with the same number of missing links (i.e., 7), leading to a 87.5%
14Note that we do not have α−k = 4 and β−k = 2 here. It can be shown that if k < −1/4, then setting
α− k = 4 and β − k = 2 means that integration with conformity is no longer Pareto dominant as in EXO
and ENDO.
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Figure 11: Proportion of missing links in Treatment SUBSIDY. The green area repre-
sents the number of missing links between players with different types divided
by the total number of possible links. The brown area represents the number
of missing links between players with the same type divided by the total number
of possible links.
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Figure 12: Fraction of choosing ‘up’ in Treatments COST(TOP) and SUB-
SIDY(BOTTOM). The brown (green) area represents the fraction of minority
(majority) players choosing action ‘up’.
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(a) EXOSYM (b) EXOASYM
Figure 13: Across types connectivity in exogenous incomplete networks (links within types
are not shown). A circle (triangle) node prefers action blue (red).
connectivity across types (note that within a preference type there is full connectivity).15
For robustness, we consider one symmetric and one asymmetric pattern of missing links.
In EXOSYM every minority player has exactly one missing link with a majority player
(see Figure 13(a)). In EXOASYM one minority player is missing all but one links with
majority players while the remaining six minority players are connected to all the majority
players (see Figure 13(b) where the filled triangle node represents the minority player with
missing links with all but one majority players).16
We present the equilibrium analysis of the coordination game in these networks.
Proposition 7. Suppose |Nu| > |Nd|. Fix an incomplete network g in which only |Nd|
links are missing between minority and majority players, and the degree of any majority
player is at least n − 2. Suppose x∗ is a Nash equilibrium. Then the following outcomes
are possible:
(i) conformity on m ∈ {up, down} if n ≥ α/β + |Nd|.
(ii) diversity with every player choosing their preferred action, if |Nu|, |Nd| ≥ β(n+1)α+β .
The proof is presented in Appendix A. The main point to note is that conformity
15Figure 7 reveals that, across types, the linking ratio oscillates between 80% and 90% in ENDO.
16Moreover, in both EXOSYM and EXOASYM, we ensure that no majority player has more than
one missing link with a minority player. This is a simplifying assumption as the majority player’s behavior
does not vary between EXO and ENDO.
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(on up or down) and diversity both remain equilibrium outcomes under EXOSYM and
EXOASYM. Figure 13 illustrates the diversity outcomes.
There were 6 groups for each of the two network treatments (see Figure 14). Under
EXOSYM, one group converges to conformity on the majority’s preferred action, one
group converges to conformity on the minority’s preferred action, and the remaining four
groups converge to diversity. Under EXOASYM, three groups converge to conformity on
the majority’s preferred action and the remaining three groups converge to diversity. As a
result, while the diversity outcome was reached in all 6 groups (i.e., in 100% of the cases)
under ENDO, it was attained in only 7 out of 12 groups (58%) under EXOSYM and
EXOASYM.
To summarize:
Experimental Finding 4. In the almost complete exogenous networks, subjects choose
conformity in over 40% of the cases. By contrast, when the same networks are endogenously
created, subjects choose diversity in 100% of the cases.
This sharp difference in outcomes supports the view that the choice of linking per se is
important in shaping behavior.
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Figure 14: Fraction of choosing ‘up’ in Treatments EXOSYM (TOP) and EXOASYM
(BOTTOM). The brown (green) area represents the fraction of minority (ma-
jority) players choosing action ‘up’.
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5 Alternative explanations
This section examines some of the dominant theoretical approaches to understanding coor-
dination problems that rely upon beliefs and dynamics, and on introspection, respectively.
We argue that, despite their relevance to our experimental game, none of them provides an
adequate account for the key experimental finding on the differing coordination outcome
between the exogenous and the endogenous network treatments.
5.1 Beliefs and dynamics
We start with the approach that focuses on the role of small errors in the process of choice,
over time. The idea here is that individuals make small errors or conduct small experiments
while dynamically playing the above game and these deviations off the best response help
in identifying one of the many (static) equilibrium outcomes. So we will consider a model
of dynamics with small perturbations.17
First consider an exogenous complete network g. In any round t > 1, the dynamic
process is described as follows. In each round, a player i is chosen at random to update
his strategy xti myopically, best responding to what the other players with whom he in-
teracts did in the previous round, i.e., xt−1−i . There is also a probability 0 <  < 1 that a
player trembles and chooses a strategy that he did not intend to. Thus, with probability
1 −  the strategy chosen is xti = arg maxx′i ui(θi, x′i, x
t−1
−i , g) and with probability  the
strategy is xti 6= arg maxx′i ui(θi, x′i, x
t−1
−i , g). The probabilities of trembles are identical and
independent across players, strategies, and rounds. These trembles can be thought of as
mistakes made by players or exogenous factors that influence players’ choices. Once initial
strategies are specified, the above process leads to a well-defined Markov chain where the
state is the vector of actions xt that is played in round t. The Markov chain has a unique
stationary distribution, denoted µ(x). Thus, for any given strategy profile x, µ(x) de-
scribes the probability that x will be the state in some round (arbitrarily) far in the future.
Let µ = lim µ
. According to Young [1993], a given state x is stochastically stable if it is
in the support of µ. Thus, a state is stochastically stable if there is a probability bounded
away from zero that the system will be in that state according to the steady state distri-
bution, for arbitrarily small probabilities of trembles. In the context of our experiment,
17Following the original work of Kandori et al. [1993] and Young [1993], the study of stability in coor-
dination games remains an active field of research; for recent work in this field, see Newton and Angus
[2015].
33
Proposition 8 specifies the existence of a unique stochastically stable state in the EXO
treatment.
Proposition 8. Consider an exogenous complete network. If βα >
n+4
3n , then conformity
on the majority’s preferred action is the unique stochastically stable outcome.
The proof is presented in Appendix A. According to Proposition 8, stochastic stability
provides a clear prediction of convergence to the conformity on the majority’s preferred
action, which is consistent with our observations from the EXO treatment.
Next consider the endogenous network formation game. Let us simplify the dynamic
process by assuming independence of actions in x and linking choices in g such that X = An
(i.e., as if linking choices and actions were selected simultaneously). Furthermore, let gt
denote the network g at the end of round t and st = (gt, xt) denote the action profile at
the end of round t (where xt is as in the exogenous case previously described). In any
arbitrary round t, we assume the following dynamic process: (1) first a pair of players ij
is randomly picked according to a fixed probability distribution pij where pij > 0 for each
i, j ∈ N . Both players then decide whether to adjust their joint strategies sij such that it
is a best response to st−1−ij for both i and j (such adjustment may therefore involve adding
or severing the link gtij and/or changing one or both actions x
t
i and x
t
j). Note that g
t
ij = 1
implies that xti = x
t
j even if x
t−1
i 6= xt−1j . Similarly, gtij = 0 implies that xti 6= xtj even if
xt−1i = x
t−1
j . (2) After those choices are made, with probability 0 <  < 1, each choice
(actions and link) is reversed by a tremble. As a result, there may be up to 3 trembles
within a single round t (both actions and the link). This process determines the state st
according to well-defined probabilities. All trembles and random selections are assumed
to be independent in the dynamic process. This leads us to determine stochastic stability
across our experimental treatments involving an endogenous network formation.
Proposition 9. Consider the endogenous linking model where k ≤ 0. If βα > n+43n , then
integration with conformity on the majority’s preferred action is the unique stochastically
stable outcome.
The proof is presented in Appendix A. Stochastic stability provides a clear prediction
of convergence to integration with conformity on the majority’s preferred action whenever
k ≤ 0 (as in Proposition 8). This result is clearly inconsistent with behavior observed
in the ENDO and SUBSIDY treatments. Thus, stochastic stability cannot provides an
adequate explanation for the behavioral patterns observed in our experiment.
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5.2 Team reasoning
Strategic uncertainty is likely to play a major role in explaining people’s behavior in our
endogenous network formation game. In such a scenario, the obvious difficulty of accurately
anticipating every other individual’s behavior leads to a search for a ‘mechanism’ that
can be used as a coordination device. Such mechanisms have been studied in the past
as possible ways to significantly simplify the framing of the strategic situation from the
players’ perspective. For example, there is evidence that strategy labeling in games can
be effectively used by collectively rational players to coordinate [Sugden, 1995, Isoni et al.,
2014]. Alternatively, it has been argued that situations involving strategic uncertainty
can trigger different modes of reasoning. Indeed, as suggested by Bacharach et al. [2006],
some individuals may engage in some form of team reasoning : they identify themselves
as members of a group and conceive that group as a unit of agency acting in pursuit of
some collective objective. For example, the collective payoff of a group can be determined
as the average individual payoff among its members. In the context of our experiment,
a minority (majority) team reasoner would conceive the minority (majority) group as a
unit of agency, and as a result would frame the scenario as a two player game between
the minority and the majority. This theory assumes that every player of the same type
shares the same mental model and consequently acts alike, i.e., for any i, j ∈ N , xi = xj
if θi = θj . This leads us to define a Team Reasoning equilibrium s
∗ as a strategy profile
where no individual i ∈ N can benefit by a joint deviation of all players of the same type
as i.
Formally, for any i ∈ N , Ui(s∗) = maxsJ Ui(sJ , s∗−J) where J = {j ∈ J : θj = θi},
and sJ =
∏
j∈J xj is a joint strategy of group J .
18 In a complete network, this assump-
tion of same-type similarity in behavior considerably simplifies the decision problem, as
summarized in the following result.
Proposition 10. Consider an exogenous complete network. If |Nu| > |Nd| and |Nd|n <
β
α <
|Nu|
n , then conformity on the majority’s preferred action is the unique team reasoning
equilibrium.
The proof is presented in Appendix A. Our empirical observations from EXO are
consistent with Proposition 10. In particular, the above equilibrium is justified as follows:
it is strictly dominant for the majority to play their preferred action, and knowing this,
18This equilibrium concept is an extreme case of the unreliable team interaction equilibrium introduced
by Bacharach [1999] where all players are assumed to be team reasoners with probability 1.
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the minority is better off conforming to the majority’s preferred action (see the proof
of Proposition 10 for details). This difference in the depth of reasoning that is required
highlights the difficulty for the minority to reach equilibrium as compared to the majority.
The same theory can be applied to the endogenous network formation game, where we
similarly assume that every player of the same type shares the same number of proposed
links, i.e., for any i, j ∈ N , xi = xj and |gi| = |gj | if θi = θj . This extended assumption of
same type similarity in behavior leads to the following result.
Proposition 11. Let mu be the number of proposed links by every majority player with
the minority (0 ≤ mu ≤ |Nu|), and md be the number of proposed links by every minority
player with the majority (0 ≤ md ≤ |Nd|). If |Nu| > |Nd|, |Nd||Nu| <
α−β
β , and
|Nd|
|Nu|−1 ≥
β
α−β ,
then a team reasoning equilibrium is described as one of the following:
• Full integration (mu = |Nu| and md = |Nd|) with conformity on the majority’s pre-
ferred action up.
• Segregation (mu = 0 and md = 0) with diversity.
• Partial integration (0 < mu < |Nu| and/or 0 < md < |Nd|) with diversity only if
k ≤ 0.
The proof is presented in Appendix A. The conditions in Proposition 11 are consistent
with all our experimental treatments involving endogenous linking. In the baseline sce-
nario where k = 0, it is clear that the minority’s linking activity in the first stage plays an
important signalling role for their subsequent behavior in the second stage. More specif-
ically, all minority players forming links with the majority signal their joint intention to
conform on the majority’s preferred action. However, if all minority players propose links
with all but one majority players, it signals their intention to select their preferred action
afterwards. While our observations in ENDO are consistent with this kind of equilibrium
behavior (according to Figure 7, no more than 90% of links are proposed by the minority
to the majority), it is worth noting that this theory alone does not suffice to justify the
selection of one particular team reasoning equilibrium, i.e., why did subjects select partial
integration with diversity rather than full integration with conformity?
In previous studies, it has been argued that team reasoning is triggered as a means
to help people solve complex coordination problems that are too difficult to solve through
individualistic reasoning. In our context however, we note that team reasoning does not
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solve the coordination problem by isolating a unique rational outcome but only reduces
the set of available solutions (this multiplicity of equilibrium is highlighted in Proposition
11). As a result, strategic uncertainty remains even among team reasoners, and therefore
no clear prediction can be made.
To conclude, although the team reasoning predictions are consistent with the behav-
ior observed in both exogenous and endogenous networks from our experiment, they are
insufficient to justify the difference in behavior across those treatments.
5.3 Social preferences
Social preferences have been used to understand behavior in economic settings. Fehr and
Schmidt [1999] and Bolton and Ockenfels [2000] argue that people are sensitive to inequality
in payoffs and often act to reduce such inequality. One could therefore argue that such
inequity aversion can explain results from our experiment. Observe that conformism creates
a large gap in payoffs between the minority and the majority, whereas payoffs are relatively
similar under heterogeneity. However, this argument applies equally well for the exogenous
and for endogenous treatments. But we find that in the treatment EXO, players choose
in favor of conformity, while with the same payoff considerations, they choose in favor of
diversity in the endogenous linking treatment. If inequity aversion were a strong driving
force of behavior, we would expect diversity to emerge in both settings, which is not what
we observe.
Alternatively, Charness and Rabin [2002] argue that people may be sensitive to dif-
ferent kinds of social welfare: one may indeed be motivated to help the worst off person
(“Maximin” or “Rawlsian” egalitarian criterion) or to maximize the total surplus (classical
utilitarianism). In the context of our experiment however, those different motivations lead
to aligned preferences (e.g., conformity maximizes both the total surplus and the worst off
individual’s payoff).
5.4 Bounded reasoning
We next explore the role of limited cognitive abilities. Here we consider cognitive hierarchy
theory as introduced by Camerer et al. [2004], according to which players are assumed to be
heterogeneous in terms of their depth of reasoning (or reasoning levels). This theory says
that naive level 0 players choose at random, level 1 players best respond to expected level
0 players’ choices, level 2 players best respond to expected level 1 players’ choices, and so
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on. Applying this theory to the exogenous complete network game from EXO, we obtain
the following prediction: as level 0 players will play randomly regardless of their type, level
1 players will best respond by selecting their preferred action (out of 14 other players, 7
are expected to play their preferred action, which is enough according to Proposition 1). If
the size of the minority is large enough, as in EXO, then any level m player (with m >1)
will best respond to level m − 1 players by also selecting their preferred action. In other
words, diversity is the predicted outcome.
Note that this prediction is robust to the type of naive behavior assumed by the level
0 players. In fact, suppose instead that level 0 players’ default behavior is to select their
preferred action. In this case, as above, any level m player (m >0) will choose their
preferred action as a best response to level m−1 players. Our experimental findings under
EXO are inconsistent with this prediction.
Hence, established theories of equilibrium selection cannot explain the outcomes we
observe in our experiments.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies social coordination in a setting where individuals prefer to coordinate
with others but they differ on their preferred action. Our interest is in understanding the
role of the choice of linking with others in shaping individual choice.
To clarify the key considerations, we start by setting out a theoretical model. There
is a group of individuals who each choose between two actions “up” or “down”. Everyone
prefers to coordinate on one action but individuals differ in the action they prefer. We
consider a baseline setting in which everyone is obliged to interact with everyone else and a
setting in which individuals choose with whom to interact. In the latter setting, everyone
observes the network that is created and then chooses between action up and down. The
theoretical analysis reveals a rich set of possibilities.
In the case where everyone interacts with everyone else there exist three equilibria:
everyone conforming to one action, everyone conforming to the other action, and diversity
with the two groups choosing their preferred actions. In the setting with endogenous linking
the outcomes take two forms: either every individual connects to everyone else and the
action profile corresponds to one of the three equilibria described above, or the network is
only partially connected. In the latter case the network may fragment into two components
and individuals in each component choose a different action. Finally, we show that in both
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the exogenous and endogenous interaction setting, conforming to the majority’s preferred
action maximizes aggregate welfare. Thus there is multiplicity in outcomes both in the
exogenous and the endogenous linking case and there is a tension between diversity and
aggregate welfare.
Our experiments reveal that, in an exogenous complete network, subjects choose to
conform to the majority’s preferred action. By contrast, when linking is free and endoge-
nous, subjects form dense networks but choose diverse actions. The networks are biased
in favour of linking within same preferences type. An examination of the dynamics of
action choice reveals that convergence to the steady state diverse actions is faster under
endogenous linking as compared to the convergence to conformity on the majority’s pre-
ferred action under the exogenous complete network. Thus our experiments suggest that
individuals use links – selectively – to resolve the coordination problems they face.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. Let x and y be the number of players playing down in Nu and Nd, respectively. The
sum of individual payoffs is
W (x, y) = (n− x− y)(α(|Nu| − x) + β(|Nd| − y)) + (x+ y)(βx+ αy). (7)
For fixed y, social welfare is decreasing in x if x < x∗ and increasing in x for x > x∗,
where
x∗ =
β(|Nd| − 2y) + α(|Nu| − 2y) + α(n)
2(α+ β)
. (8)
Similarly, for any x, social welfare is decreasing in y if y < y∗, and increasing in y for
y > y∗, where
y∗ =
α(|Nu| − 2x) + β(|Nd| − 2x) + β(n)
2(α+ β)
(9)
Since 0 ≤ x ≤ |Nu| and 0 ≤ y ≤ |Nd|, it follows that W (x, y) is maximized for
some x ∈ {0, |Nu|} and some y ∈ {0, |Nd|}. Note that W (0, |Nd|) = α(|Nu|2 + |Nd|2),
and W (|Nu|, 0) = β(|Nu|2 + |Nd|2), which directly implies that W (0, |Nd|) > W (|Nu|, 0)
(because α > β). Furthermore, since W (0, 0) = n(α|Nu|+ β|N|), we have that W (0, 0) >
W (0, |Nd|) if and only if
|Nu|
|Nd| >
α− β
α+ β
(10)
This inequality holds whenever |Nu| > |Nd|.
Similarly, since W (|Nu|, |Nd|) = n(β|Nu| + α|Nd|), we have that W (|Nu|, |Nd|) >
W (0, |Nd|) if and only if
|Nd|
|Nu| >
α− β
α+ β
(11)
This inequality holds whenever |Nd| > |Nu|. Furthermore, note that equations (10)
and (11) hold for |Nu| = |Nd| as long as β > 0. To summarize, we always have that either
W (0, 0) > W (0, |Nd|) or W (|Nu|, |Nd|) > W (0, |Nd|) as long as |Nu| 6= |Nd| or β > 0.
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Finally, consider the case where x = |Nu| and y = |Nd|: this implies that x + y = n.
Since α > β, it can be shown that W (0, 0) > W (|Nu|, |Nd|) so long as |Nu| > |Nd|.
Moreover, W (0, 0) < W (|Nu|, |Nd|) holds as long as |Nu| < |Nd|. Finally, W (0, 0) =
W (|Nu|, |Nd|) if |Nu| = |Nd|.
We now show that with endogenous interaction, social welfare is maximized under
integration and conformism on the majority’s action. The argument is as follows: Start
from any network g and any configuration of actions x. Now add all missing links and
obtain the complete network. Since k = 0 the aggregate payoff remains unchanged. But
we know from the first part of the proof that, in the complete network, aggregate payoffs
are maximized under conformism on the majority’s preferred action. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Proof. Suppose any conformity outcome in (i). Since the number of missing links between
minority and majority players is |Nd|, any player must have at least a degree n− |Nd| − 1
(lowest degree for a minority player missing all |Nd| links). All players who select their
preferred action can clearly not improve their payoff through any deviation. However,
the payoff for players selecting their least preferred action is at least (n − |Nd|)β. Any
individual deviation from such players instead yields α. As a result, conformity is an
equilibrium whenever (n− |Nd|)β ≥ α, which can be rewritten as n ≥ α/β + |Nd|.
Suppose the diversity outcome in (ii). Since the number of missing links between
minority and majority players is |Nd| and |Nu| > |Nd|, there must exist at least one majority
player with a degree n − 1 (linked with everyone else). There may also be some minority
player(s) with a similar degree (e.g., if some other minority player is missing more than
one link). It then directly follows that any such player will earn |Ny|α where y ∈ {u, d}.
Any unilateral deviation however yields (n− |Ny|+ 1)β. As a result, such a player is not
better off deviating if |Ny|α ≥ (n − |Ny| + 1)β, which can be rewritten as |Ny| ≥ β(n+1)α+β .
Since other players can only be less connected with the opposite type, they can also not
benefit by deviating under this condition. Thus, diversity is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 8:
Proof. Let Nmaj be the majority group whose members prefer action x ∈ {up, down}, i.e.,
Nmaj = {i ∈ N : θi = x}, and Nmin = N\Nmaj represents the minority group in N .
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The set of absorbing states is characterised by the set of Nash equilibria in pure strategies
as specified by Proposition 2. Without loss of generality, let Cmaj define the conformity
outcome where everyone selects the majority’s preferred action x (∈ {up, down}), Cmin
define the conformity outcome where everyone selects the minority’s preferred action y 6= x,
and D define the diversity outcome where everyone plays their preferred action. As a result,
there are at most three recurrent communication classes each of which corresponds to a
particular absorbing state: Cmaj , Cmin, and D. We want to determine the resistance
of every path between every two recurrent classes, which corresponds to the number of
trembles necessary to move from one absorbing state to another. For example, r(Cmaj , D)
determines the resistance from state Cmaj to state D. According to Proposition 1, every
player in the complete network selects their preferred action if m other players in N also
select it, such that nβ−αα+β < m ≤ nβ−αα+β + 1. From Cmaj , it therefore takes at least m
players from Nmin to switch their action through trembles before it is a best response
for the remaining players to switch theirs. As a result, we have r(Cmaj , D) = m. A
similar argument leads to r(Cmin, D) = m. From D, it takes at least |Nmin| −m players
from Nmin to tremble before it is a best response for the remaining players from Nmin to
switch theirs. Therefore, we have r(D,Cmaj) = |Nmin| −m. A similar argument leads to
r(D,Cmin) = |Nmaj | −m as it takes |Nmaj | −m players from Nmaj to tremble before it is
a best response for the remaining players from Nmaj to switch theirs.
Finally, it is easy to see that r(Cmaj , Cmin) = r(Cmaj , D) + r(D,Cmin) = |Nmaj | and
r(Cmin, Cmaj) = r(Cmin, D) + r(D,Cmaj) = |Nmin|.
According to Young [1993], given any state x, an x-tree is a directed graph with a
vertex for each state and a unique directed path leading from each state y (6= x) to x.
The resistance of x, noted r(x), is then defined by finding an x-tree that minimizes the
summed resistance over directed edges. From the above, it is easy to show that r(Cmaj) =
r(Cmin, D) + r(D,Cmaj) = |Nmin|, r(Cmin) = r(Cmaj , D) + r(D,Cmin) = |Nmaj |, and
r(D) = r(Cmin, D)+r(Cmaj , D) = 2m. Since |Nmin| < |Nmaj |, we have r(Cmaj) < r(Cmin).
Moreover, βα >
n+4
3n implies that |Nmin| < n2 < 2m, and therefore r(Cmaj) < r(D). It
follows that Cmaj is the only stochastically stable outcome [Young, 1993].
Proof of Proposition 9:
Proof. Let us first determine the set of absorbing states. It is easy to see that any two
players who play the same action must be linked with each other. This implies that the
network corresponds to a set of isolated complete components. Moreover, since |A| = 2,
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there can be at most 2 such components. We will refer to any complete network as an
integration outcome, and any network with 2 distinct components a segregation outcome.
First, it is straightforward to see that any integration outcome with conformity on the
same action from A is always stable. Regarding the segregation outcomes, since k ≤ 0, it
is then easy to show that they all belong to the same absorbing state, which consists of
the complete network where every player selects their preferred action. In fact, in any such
segregation outcome, it is (weakly) dominant for everyone to form links with everyone else.
In the resulting complete network, the only stable diversity outcome is one where every
player chooses their preferred action (see proof of Proposition 8 for details).
Regarding the recurrent communication classes, we therefore denote Cmaj as the inte-
gration state with conformity on the majority’s action, Cmin as the integration state with
conformity on the minority’s action, and D as the integration state with diversity. The
proof of Proposition 9 then directly follows from the proof of Proposition 8.
Proof of Proposition 10:
Proof. Since players of the same type choose the same action, they each earn the same
payoff. We then refer to the majority and the minority as single entities. Note that the
majority would obtain at least |Nu|α for playing up, and at most nβ for playing down. If
β
α <
|Nu|
n , then it is strictly dominant for the majority to play up. Moreover, the minority
would then obtain |Nd|α for selecting down, and nβ for selecting up (assuming the majority
plays up). Since βα >
|Nd|
n , the minority is then strictly better off selecting up. This yields
conformity on the majority’s action as the only equilibrium solution.
Proof of Proposition 11:
Proof. We again refer to the majority and the minority as single entities. It is straightfor-
ward to see that segregation with diversity is a subgame perfect equilibrium for any k ≥ 0.
Now let us assume that k ≤ 0. If the majority proposes md links with the minority, then
playing down would at most yield |Nu|(β − k) + k − mdk if the minority plays up, and
(Nu+md)(β−k)+k if the minority plays down. Similarly, playing up would at most yield
(Nu + md)(α − k) + k if the minority plays up, and Nu(α − k) + k −mdk if the minority
plays down. Since md|Nu| ≤
|Nd|
|Nu| <
α−β
β , playing down is strictly dominated by playing up
for the majority, regardless of the links proposed and formed with the minority. Similarly,
assuming the minority forms mu links with the majority, playing up would at most yield
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(|Nd|+mu)(β−k)+k, and playing down would at most yield |Nd|(α−k)+k−muk. Since
|Nd|
|Nu|−1 ≥
β
α−β , it follows that the minority prefers down if and only if the network is fully
integrated (i.e., mu = |Nu| and md = |Nd|). As a result, conformity on up is compatible
only under full integration. Any partial integration or segregation will lead to a diversity
outcome where the majority and the minority play their preferred action.
Appendix B Additional Experiments
B.1 Different costs of linking
This section presents two additional experiments we ran: COST+ and SUBSIDY-. The
former is a treatment with higher linking cost than in the positive cost treatment COST,
given by k = 2 > 0.5. The game is as in COST, but we set the value of other parameters at
α = 6, β = 4. The latter is a treatment with lower subsidy compared to SUBSIDY, given
by k = −0.1 > −0.3. the game is as in SUBSIDY so that the value of other parameters
remain α = 4 and β = 2.
First, we look at the main findings in the COST+ treatment. Consistent with the
results from COST, we observe in Figure 15a that increasing the cost of linking leads
to lower linking across preference types compared to COST. (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney:
z = 7.142, p < 0.0001), but that does not significantly affect the long run outcome: we still
observe (almost complete) segregation and diversity (see Figure 16a). Notably, in COST+
individuals choose actions more or less in line with their preferences. The majority choose
its preferred action almost from the start and persist with it for the entire experiment.
The minority players mostly choose their preferred action during the first rounds of play
and by round 11 no minority player is choosing the action of the majority. The effect of
linking costs is clear, segregation and diversity.
For the second treatment, SUBSIDY-, consistent with the results in SUBSIDY, a
positive subsidy for linking (negative cost) increases the level of connectivity. Moreover,
there are no significant differences in network density between treatments (Wilcoxon-Mann
Whitney: z = 1.603, p = 0.1089). This is particularly clear when observing from Figure
15b that of all the missing links, which are on average not different from SUBSIDY
(Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney: z = 0.202, p = 0.8398), most are again between players with
different preference types. Diversity of actions is a prominent outcome in SUBSIDY-
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(a) Connectivity COST+ (b) Connectivity SUBSIDY-
Figure 15: Fraction of missing links in Treatments COST+ and SUBSIDY-. The green
area represents the number of missing links between players with different types
divided by the total number of possible links. The brown area represents the
number of missing links between players with the same type divided by the total
number of possible links.
with 50% of the groups portraying complete diversity (see Figure 16b)19. Thus, a positive
subsidy promotes integration and to a large extent diversity in actions.
B.2 Small minority representation
We briefly studied the role of the size of the minority. As it falls, the payoff losses of
separating itself rise. This may induce greater integration and conformism.
To test this hypothesis, we conducted an SMALLMIN treatment in which we varied
group composition, from 8 majority and 7 minority players (main experimental treatments)
to 12 majority and 3 minority players. In this case, if the minority players are excluded by
the majority for not conforming, they will be better off seeking redemption than segregat-
ing. We invited 90 subjects to participate in two sessions of 45 subjects each. The game
and parameters are as in COST+, i.e., with a cost of linking k = 2, and we only vary the
group composition.
In SMALLMIN, having a larger majority and a smaller minority results in a densely-
connected network. Out of the 105-possible links that can be formed, individuals in
19While 3 out of the 6 groups converged to diversity, the 3 remaining groups converged to conformity on
the majority’s preferred action.
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(a) Treatment COST+ (b) Treatment SUBSIDY-
Figure 16: Fraction of choosing ‘up’ in Treatments COST+ and SUBSIDY-. The brown
(green) area represents the fraction of minority (majority) players choosing
action ‘up’.
SMALLMIN form on average 94.61 links across groups and rounds, which is significantly
greater than the level of connectivity in ENDO (z=1.97, p=0.049). The majority formed
significantly more links than the minority across rounds, 12.84>11.73 (z=-6.8, p=0.00).
As illustrated in Figure 17a, it took the minority longer to link within their type than it
took the majority. But more importantly, there were multiple unreciprocated proposals
from the minority to the majority in the first rounds, which only converged after various
attempts. On average (across groups and rounds), the minority proposed 10.5 links to the
majority in the first five rounds and only 7.6 links were formed. The majority, on the
other hand, proposed 2.0 and formed 1.9 links with the minority in the same block. While
the majority players were at first reluctant to create links with the minority, the minority
players insisted on linking. This persistence appears to have triggered reciprocity in the
following rounds.
We observe that the initial reluctance of the majority to form connections with the
minority breaks down due to both the persistence of link proposals from the minority and
due to the behavior of the minority. More specifically, we observe that from the first round,
78% of the minority players conformed (i.e. chose the action they preferred the least), and
by round 3 all minority players were conforming completely. In fact, once the network
is complete, we expect that all players will conform to the same action. The number
of majority players choosing their preferred action is not different from 12 across rounds
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(a) Connectivity SMALLMIN (b) Conformity SMALLMIN
Figure 17: Fractions of (a) missing links and (b) choosing ‘up’ in Treatment SMALLMIN.
(a) The green area represents the number of missing links between players with
different types divided by the total number of possible links. The brown area
represents the number of missing links between players with the same type
divided by the total number of possible links. (b) The brown (green) area
represents the fraction of minority (majority) players choosing action ‘up’.
(t=-1.75, p=0.08) and the number of minority players conforming is not different from 3
across rounds after round 1 (t=-1.91, p=0.058). See Figure 17b for detailed behavior across
groups.
In summary, we conclude that when the minority group size is significantly smaller
than the majority group size, subjects converge rapidly to integration and conformity on
the majority’s preferred action.
Appendix C Instructions
All treatments:
You are participating in an economic experiment where you have to make decisions.
For participating in this experiment, you will receive a minimum payment of 5e. Please,
read carefully these instructions to find out how you can earn additional money.
All interactions between you and the other participants take place through the comput-
ers. Please, do not talk to the other participants or communicate with them in other way.
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If you have questions, raise your hand and an experimentalist will come to you to answer it.
This experiment is anonymous. Therefore, your identity will not be revealed to the
other participants nor theirs to you.
In this experiment, you can earn points. At the end of the experiment, those points
will be converted to Euros using the following exchange rate: 50 points = 1e. You will
receive your earnings in cash.
This experiment is composed by 2 identical stages. The first stage is a trial stage, it
lasts 5 rounds and the points you earn will not be exchanged for Euros. The second stage
is the real experiment, it lasts 20 rounds, and the points you earn will be exchanged for
Euros at the end of the experiment. Next, you will be informed of the decisions to you can
make in each round.
Decisions in each round
At the beginning of each round, all participants are randomly assigned to groups of
size 15. You will be in a group with the same people for an entire stage. Please, remember
that the first stage is a trial stage (5 rounds), and the second is the experiment (20 rounds).
Each participant in a group is randomly assigned a symbol (circle or triangle) and a
number (between 1 and 15). You will be informed about your number and your symbol
at the bottom of your screen, which will not change within a stage. That is, your number
and your symbol might change from the trial stage to the experiment stage, but not be-
tween the rounds of a given stage.
Specific to Treatment ENDO only:
Each round consists of 3 phases: (1) Linking, (2) Action and (3) Earnings.
Phase 1. Linking
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At the beginning of the first round you will see the interaction network formed in the
previous round. Naturally, in round 1 you will see an empty network. You will see your
number and your type, and the numbers and types of the other participants, as illustrated
in the image below. You will be highlighted with a thicker border, to facilitate that you
can identify yourself in the screen.
The first decision you make regards whom you want to propose a connection to. You
can propose between 1 and 14 connections. To do so, you have to click the checkbox next
to a participants number, in the list on the right hand side of the screen. Once you checked
all the proposals you want to make, click the Continue button.
A connection is formed if 2 participants propose to each other. In Phase 2 (Action)
you will interact only with the participants to whom are connected.
Phase 2. Action
Once all participants have made all their proposals, you will see the resulting network
of interactions. A line starting from you and reaching another participant represents a con-
nection between you and the other participant. A thinner line starting from you, directed
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to another participant, without reaching him, represents a proposal you made to the such
participant, which he did not reciprocate. Similarly, a line starting from other participant,
directed to you without reaching you, represents a proposal the other participant made
you but you did not reciprocate.
The red lines represent your relations, and the black lines represent the relations be-
tween the other participants.
On the right-hand side of the screen you can choose between two actions: up or down
(you must choose one of them). Depending on your symbol and the decisions made by
the participants you linked to in the first stage, you can earn points. This is explained as
follows:
If you are circle and you:
• choose up, you receive 4 points for each of your connections choosing up
• choose down, you receive 2 points for each of your connections choosing down
If you are triangle and you:
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• choose down, you receive 4 points for each of your connections choosing down
• choose up, you receive 2 points for each of your connections choosing up
Phase 3. Earnings
In the last phase of each round you will see the points you earned given your interac-
tions. On the left-hand side of the screen you will see the connections you formed. Those
participants choosing the same action as you will be displayed with a red border, otherwise
they will have a black border. This will allow you to easily calculate the points you earn
in the current round.
Please, bear in mind that you earn points for each participant you are linked to who
chooses the same action as you (displayed with a red border). The exact amount of points
(4 or 2) will depend on your symbol and the action you chose (as explained in Phase 2
(Action).
The total amount of points you earn will be the sum of the points you obtained during
the 20 rounds of the experiment (the second stage).
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Next, we present two examples:
Example 1: You are a circle, you are linked to 10 participants, you have chosen up
and 4 of your connections have chosen up as well (6 have chosen down). Therefore, you
earn 4 points for coordinating with yourself (you always coordinate with yourself), and
16 (4×4=16) points for coordinating with the other 4. Your earnings in the round are 20
points in total.
Example 2: You are a circle, you are linked to 10 participants, you have chosen down
and 6 of your connections have chosen down as well (4 have chosen up). Therefore, you
earn 2 points for coordinating with yourself (you always coordinate with yourself), and
12 (2×6=12) points for coordinating with the other 6. Your earnings in the round are 14
points in total.
Specific to Treatment EXO only:
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Each round consists of 2 phases: (1) Action and (2) Earnings.
Phase 1. Action
At the beginning of each round you will see the group of participants you interact with
and their choices in the previous round (in the first round you will see the participants
without any previous decision). You will see your number and your type, and the numbers
and types of the other participants, as illustrated in the image below. You will be high-
lighted with a thicker border, to facilitate that you can identify yourself in the screen.
On the right-hand side of the screen you can choose between two actions: up or down
(you must choose one of them). Depending on your symbol and the decisions made by
the participants you linked to in the first stage, you can earn points. This is explained as
follows:
If you are circle and you:
• choose up, you receive 4 points for each of your connections choosing up
• choose down, you receive 2 points for each of your connections choosing down
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If you are triangle and you:
• choose down, you receive 4 points for each of your connections choosing down
• choose up, you receive 2 points for each of your connections choosing up
Phase 2. Earnings
In the last phase of each round you will see the points you earned given your interac-
tions. On the left-hand side of the screen you will see the connections you formed. Those
participants choosing the same action as you will be displayed with a red border, otherwise
they will have a black border. This will allow you to easily calculate the points you earn
in the current round.
Please, bear in mind that you earn points for each participant you are linked to who
chooses the same action as you (displayed with a red border). The exact amount of points
(4 or 2) will depend on your symbol and the action you chose (as explained in Phase 1
(Action).
The total amount of points you earn will be the sum of the points you obtained during
the 20 rounds of the experiment (the second stage).
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Next, me present two examples:
Example 1: You are a circle, you have chosen up and 4 other participants have chosen
up as well (10 have chosen down). Therefore, you earn 4 points for coordinating with
yourself (you always coordinate with yourself), and 16 (4×4=16) points for coordinating
with the other 4. Your earnings in the round are 20 points in total.
Example 2: You are a circle, you have chosen down and 10 other participants have
chosen down as well (4 have chosen up). Therefore, you earn 2 points for coordinating with
yourself (you always coordinate with yourself), and 20 (2×10=20) points for coordinating
with the other 6. Your earnings in the round are 22 points in total.
All treatments:
Summary In each round, you can create connections. You will earn points from those
participants you are connected to who chose the same action as you (coordinate with you).
The session consists of 2 stages, the first is a trial stage, which lasts 5 rounds, and the latter
is the experiment and lasts 20 rounds. You will participate with the same 15 participants
for a whole stage (trial or experiment), but your group, symbol and number, and those of
the other participants, might change between stages.
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